Pengadopsian Mekanisme Fast-Track Legislation dalam Pengusulan Rancangan Undang-Undang oleh Presiden

Ibnu Sina Chandranegara

  Abstract


Pembentukan undang-undang pada medio 2019-2020 kerap dianggap tidak berkualitas yang disebabkan pembahasan yang sembunyi-sembunyi, tidak transparan, dan terkesan terburu-buru. Kondisi ini memperburuk proses legislasi di Indonesia. Mekanisme fast-track legislation yang tidak dimiliki di Indonesia namun seolah-olah telah dipraktikkan, mengakibatkan adanya asumsi tirani legislasi dalam proses pembentukan undang-undang di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu fast-track legislation menjadi alternatif gagasan untuk membatasi kekuasaan praktik pembentukan undang-undang yang buruk tidak terulang kembali. Artikel ini dimaksudkan untuk meninjau bagaimana pengaturan dan praktik fast-track legislation di berbagai negara serta menganalisis proyeksi pengadopsian fast-track legislation ke dalam sistem pembentukan undang-undang di Indonesia dengan cara menelaah secara konseptual tentang pembatasan kekuasaan presiden di bidang legislasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif, dengan pendekatan perbandingan hukum. penelitian dilakukan dengan meneliti materi pengaturan dan praktik pelaksanaan fast-track legislation di beberapa negara yang memilikinya seperti Inggris, Amerika Serikat, Selandia Baru, Perancis, Kolombia, dan Ekuador untuk ditemukan hal yang dapat diadopsi dan hal yang perlu dihindari apabila kemudian diadopsi ke dalam pembentukan undang-undang di Indonesia.


  Keywords


pembentukan undang-undang yang buruk; fast track legislation; perundang-undangan

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2021.V21.123-140

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