



IDEA OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF SINGLE CANDIDATE IN LOCAL ELECTION

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ABSTRACT

The existence of single candidate in the 2015-2020 simultaneous Local Election (Pilkada) period tends to dramatically increase along with the rise of the political parties coalition supporting single candidate, thus closing the opportunity for other candidates to advance through a political party. In the practice of organizing single-candidate elections, several cases have been exposed to the public, which suggests that there were problems before the single candidate was decided. This study describes the various phenomena that arise in the organization of single-candidate elections and formulates appropriate structuring strategies. This research was normative and sociological legal research. Normatively using a statute approach and case approach, while sociologically using a qualitative approach. Several phenomena were found, namely; the increasing support of political parties for single candidate is due to the pragmatic political parties that are oriented towards victory and instant profit (political dowry), resulting in a large financial burden that must be prepared by prospective candidates. This condition is exceptionally favorable for candidates with sufficient financial capabilities which then motivates political parties to smooth the victory. Appropriate structuring measures are needed, including; first, the need to reduce the nomination threshold for political parties. Second, organizing party coalitions both related to the time of formation and the maximum limit of the coalition, and third, tightening the eligibility requirements for single candidate by considering the level of voter turnout.

Keyword: arrangement; local election; single candidate

1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2014, the President and the DPR (House of Representatives) issued Law Number 22 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (UU No.22/2014) which stipulated that regional heads are elected by DPRD (Regional House of Representatives). This law abolished the direct regional election policy which had been in effect for more than 10 years. However, Law No.22/2014 drew a lot of criticism from the public so in the end, the President issued a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors (Perppu No.1/2014). The DPR also approved the Perppu through Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2014 concerning Elections for Governors, Regents, and Mayors (UU No.1/2015).


Important changes related to the implementation of Pilkada (Local Election) in Law No.1/2015¹ is the policy of implementing regional elections simultaneously. Arief Budiman² stated that this policy change was made because the implementation of non-simultaneously regional elections have an impact on budget waste, political conditions that were not conducive such as prolonged conflict, resulting in less effective government because the time for holding them was not the same as the time for the election of members of the DPR/DPD/ DPRD or president/vice president.

1 Pasal 3 Ayat (1) Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 Meyebutkan Bahwa ‘Pemilihan Dilaksanakan Setiap 5 (Lima) Tahun Sekali Secara Serentak Di Seluruh Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia’.

2 Indaru Setyo Nurprojo, “Bagongan, Pilkada Serentak Dan Demokrasi Yang Cedera: Belajar Dari Purbalingga,” Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 1, no. 2 (2016): 120–35, <https://doi.org/10.15294/jpi.v1i2.6580>.

Simultaneous local elections have been held four times, which were in 2015, 2017, 2018, and finally in 2020. The implementation of the first simultaneous local elections in 2015 gave rise to a new phenomenon, in which there were 3 (three) regions that only had one pair of candidates (single) even though the registration period had been extended. The three regions were North Central Timor Regency, Blitar Regency, and Tasikmalaya Regency.³ The Local Election Law at that time did not regulate Local Election which was followed by one pair of candidates so the KPU (General Elections Commission) at that time adopted a policy of delaying the implementation of Pilkada in areas where there was a single candidate. The KPU's move was considered to be very prone to legal disputes, due to the absence of clear rules.

Speaking of which, Effendi Gazali then submitted a request for a judicial review of Law No. 8/2015⁴ to the Constitutional Court (MK). MK through Decision No.100/PUU-XIII/2015 granted the applicant's request that regions with a single candidate pair must continue with their local election stages until they are completed. The Constitutional Court's decision is considered to prioritize the issue of the distribution of citizens' rights protected by the Constitution and ignores the possibility of negative sides that will arise in the future. For example, by allowing local elections with a single candidate without being followed by rules limiting the support of political parties to regional head candidates, certain prospective candidates who have strong ambitions to occupy the position of the regional head can be used by contracting the support of existing political parties, thereby narrowing the emergence of other candidates. As stated by the MK judge Patrialis Akbar in his dissenting opinion, there are concerns that if a single candidate is allowed to hold Pilkada, it is possible that there will be acts of "law smuggling" and liberalization in the process of nominating regional heads so that capital owners were able to 'buy' all political parties and Pilkada was only followed by 1 (one) pair.⁵ This concern became a reality because, after the simultaneous Pilkada tahun in 2015, the single candidate continued to increase in the next simultaneous Pilkada periods (2017, 2018, and 2020). More details can be seen in the following graph.



Graph: Single Candidate Pilkada Growth 2015-2020.

Source: processed from the website kpu.go.id, 12 February 2023.

Based on the graph above, it can be observed that there has been a significant increase in single candidate, from initially only 3 regions (2015) increased to 25 regions (2020). In the increase in the single candidate, it

3 Di samping tiga daerah di atas, terdapat empat daerah yang sebelumnya juga berpotensi calon tunggal yaitu di Kota Surabaya, Kabupaten Pacitan, Kota Samarinda, dan Kota Mataram. Namun, setelah dilakukan perpanjangan masa pendaftaran, beberapa daerah tersebut akhirnya terpenuhi syarat minimal dua pasangan calon.

4 Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 100/PUU-XIII/2015 Tentang Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 2015 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 Tentang Pengesahan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (Perppu) Nomor 1 Tahun 2014 tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Walikota menjadi Undang-Undang.

5 Dissenting Opinion Hakim Konstitusi Patrialis Akbar dalam Putusan MK No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015.

is interesting to examine what phenomena have arisen in the recent holding of the single candidate Pilkada. Several cases occurred in the election of a single candidate, for example in Jayapura City in 2017. Prior to the determination of a single candidate in the Jayapura City Pilkada, there was a polemic between several prospective candidates due to the dual support provided by political parties which ended in the settlement at the Supreme Court.⁶ Another case also occurred in Pati Regency, the failure of one of the prospective candidates (Budiono) was due to insufficient political party support because the majority of political parties preferred to carry the Haryanto-Saiful Arifin pair.⁷ Likewise, in the case that occurred in the 2018 Makassar City Pilkada, the incumbent candidate (Ramdhan Pomato) was forced to advance through the individual route. This is because the majority of political parties in Makassar City favored the Munafri Arifuddin-Andi Rahmatika Dewi pair.⁸ Interestingly, the single candidate in Makassar City actually lost against an empty column.⁹

Based on the description above, this study aimed to take a deeper look at some of the important phenomena that occur in single-candidate Pilkada which have a negative impact on the implementation of democratic Pilkada and to offer the idea of structuring the Pilkada for a single candidate in the future. Therefore, there are two main problems in this paper, namely; first, what phenomena arise in the implementation of single-candidate Pilkada which can undermine the democratic Pilkada order, and secondly, how is the idea of structuring the right regulations so that the single-candidate Pilkada remains in harmony with the principles of democratic Elections.

For the originality of this study, the author made comparisons with several previous studies. Several studies focus on studies related to the single candidate Pilkada, including; *first*, research conducted by Muchammad Ali Safa'at¹⁰ who explained the emergence of a single candidate and the role of the oligarchy in the 2020 Pilkada. The final part of the article also described the idea of regulation to reduce the potential for a single candidate by reducing the support requirements for pairs of candidates from political parties and single candidate. However, there are differences from the author's idea both in terms of the size of the coalition and the prevention strategy.

Second, research conducted by Muhammad Anwar Tanjung and Retno Saraswati¹¹ which focused on how to maintain the quality of single-candidate democracy in the midst of an increase in the number of single-candidate Pilkada. The conclusion from this research was the need for amendments to the law in the form of limiting the maximum support for seats for regional head candidates carried by parties or coalitions of political parties, reducing the percentage of support for valid votes for parties or coalitions of political parties, facilitating and reducing the amount of support and distribution of single candidate pairs, and creating a Pilkada socialization model with a single candidate in order to maintain a democratic Pilkada. This research did not

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- 6 Senalince Mara, "Demokrasi Kotak Kosong (Studi Kasus Pada Pemilukada Kota Jayapura Tahun 2017)," *Jurnal Civic Education: Media Kajian Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 2, no. 1 (2018): 54–64, <https://doi.org/10.36412/ce.v2i1.443>.
 - 7 Achmad Ronggo Prihatmono and Kris Nugroho, "Pilkada Calon Tunggal Di Kabupaten Pati Tahun 2017: Suatu Tinjauan Oligarkisme Partai Politik" 6, no. 1 (2017): 32–43, <https://doi.org/10.20473/jpi.v6i1.29869>.
 - 8 Nur Rohim Yunus, "Saat Kotak Kosong Memenangkan Pilkada," *Adalah* 2, no. 7 (2018): 69–70, <https://doi.org/10.15408/adalah.v2i7.8526>.
 - 9 Lihat "No Title," n.d., <https://datapemilu.kpu.go.id/pilkada2018/hasil2/penetapan/list/nasional>.
 - 10 Muchamad Ali Safa'at, "Single candidate: Ensuring a Path to Victory in Local Elections," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 7, no. 4 (2022): 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911211062485>.
 - 11 Muhammad Anwar Tanjung and Retno Saraswati, "Calon Tunggal Pilkada Kurangi Kualitas Demokrasi," *Jurnal Yudisial* 12, no. 3 (2020): 269, <https://doi.org/10.29123/jy.v12i3.319>. sehingga dapat menghilangkan monopoli individu atau kelompok pemodal terhadap persyaratan dukungan calon kepala daerah. Kata kunci: pemilihan kepala daerah; calon tunggal; demokrasi. ABSTRACT Philosophically, regional head elections are the implementation of people's sovereignty to be elected and vote in a democratic election process. There has been an increase in the number of regional elections with a single candidate. This research discusses the only candidate in the election of regional heads based on the Constitutional Court Decision Number 100/ PUU-XIII/2015. According to researchers, the decision of the constitutional court needs to be addressed by the stakeholders that involved keeping the election process going on democratically. This study is non-doctrinal research. The latest facts about the election of a regional head with a single candidate need to be guarded so that the polls will continue democratically. This research concludes that a single candidate in the local head election requires an appropriate legal construction (not left aside

describe in detail how to limit the amount of political party support for regional head candidates, and to reduce party requirements to nominate candidate pairs.

Third, research conducted by Endah Yuli Ekowati,¹² focused on how political pragmatism can bring up the phenomenon of a single candidate pair in regional elections. How do the regulations regulate it, and what are the future solutions so that the political pragmatism that gave rise to the single candidate phenomenon does not recur. In conclusion, this study did suggest the need to limit coalitions in nominating regional head candidates but did not provide concrete steps on how to implement these restrictions. *Fourth*, research conducted by Teguh Ilham¹³ focuses more on two things; 1) how did the emergence of a single candidate originate, and 2) what the factors causing the emergence of a single candidate in Indonesia.

The four studies above are clearly different from the research that the authors conducted. This research focuses more on several important phenomena that are the problem, namely the phenomenon of increasing political party support for a single candidate, the bulk party phenomenon, the phenomenon of pragmatic party coalitions, and the phenomenon of the large costs borne by prospective candidates. Based on this phenomenon, the researcher gave the idea of arrangement in the form of; *First*, the need to lower the nomination threshold by political parties and the requirements for support for single candidate should at least be restored before changes are made. *Second*, the need to organize party coalitions with ideas; 1) that coalitions must be formed by political parties before the pair of candidates to be nominated are determined and authorize the regional KPU to endorse the coalition; 2) limiting the size of the coalition through three concrete formulations. *Third*, initiating to tighten the requirements for elected candidates by correlating the single candidate's vote acquisition with the level of voter turnout as a strategy to avoid the practice of bulk party. Thus, there is a fairly basic difference between the focus of this study and the three previous researchers.

2. METHOD

This study applied normative and sociological legal research methods. The normative legal method used secondary data in the form of primary and secondary legal materials such as legislation in the Pilkada field, research results, and information on the holding of the Pilkada sourced from print/electronic media accessed through official websites of government/non-government institutions using the approach of laws and regulations (statute approach) and cases (case approach), while the sociological legal method uses primary data obtained through interviews.¹⁴

3. FINDING AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Several Phenomena in Single Candidate Pilkada Practices

3.1.1 Increase in the Number of Bearers of Political Parties

During the 2015 simultaneous local elections, three regions only had one pair of candidates, which were North Central Timor Regency, Blitar Regency, and Tasikmalaya Regency, with the support of political parties as shown in the following table.

12 Endah Yuli Ekowati, "Pragmatisme Politik: Antara Koalisi, Pencalonan Dan Calon Tunggal Dalam Pilkada," *Jurnal Transformatif* 5, no. 1 (2019): 16–37, <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.transformatif.2019.005.01.2>.

13 Teguh Ilham, "Fenomena Calon Tunggal Dalam Demokrasi Indonesia," *Jurnal Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah* 12, no. 2 (2020): 62–73, <https://doi.org/10.33701/jiabd.v12i2.1359>.

14 Peter Mahmud Marzuki, *Penelitian Hukum*, Revisi (Jakarta: Kencana, 2013).

Table 1: Political party support for a single candidate in 2015

| No | Regency/ City | Name of Candidate Pair | Political parties Supporters | Number of DPRD Seats | % Support ¹⁵ | Remaining support |
|----|---|--|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Blitar Regency | Drs. H. Rijanto, MM dan Marheinis Urip Widodo | PDI P, Partai Gerindra (19 Kursi) | 50 | 38 % | 62 % |
| 2 | Tasikmalaya Regency | Uu Ruzhanul Ulum - H. Ade Sugianto | PAN, PDIP, dan PKS (16 kursi) | 50 | 32 % | 68 % |
| 3 | Timor Tengah Utara (NTT) Regency | Raymundus Fernandez dan Aloysius Kobes | PDIP (8 kursi) | 30 | 26,6 % | 73,4 % |

Source: processed from the KPU website and other sources, 14 January 2023.

Based on the table above, it can be seen that political party support for a single candidate was still relatively small,¹⁶ which ranged from 26% to 38%. Meanwhile, the percentage of political parties that did not bear any candidates was 62 - 73.4%. The percentage of political parties that did not support was still large compared to political parties bearing a single candidate. Furthermore, in the 2017 simultaneous local elections, the support of political parties for a single candidate can be seen in the following table.

Table 2: Political party support for a single candidate in 2017

| No | Regency/ City | Name of Candidate Pair | Political parties Supporters | Number of DPRD seats | % Support ¹⁷ | Remaining support |
|----|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Jayapura City | Benhur Tomi Mano – Rustan Saru | PKB, Hanura, PAN, NasDem, Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, dan PKPI (33 kursi) | 40 | 82,5 % | 17,5% |
| 2 | Maluku Tengah Regency | Tuasikal Abua – Martlatu Leleury | PDI P, Golkar, Partai Gerindra, PKPI, Nasdem, Demokrat, PAN, PBB dan Hanura (34 kursi) | 40 | 85% | 15 % |
| 3 | Tulang Bawang Barat Regency | Umar Ahmad – Fauzi Hasan | PKS, Demokrat, PPP, PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PKB, Hanura, dan NasDem (30 kursi) | 30 | 100% | 0 % |
| 4 | Pati Regency | Haryanto – Saiful Arifin | PDIP, PKB, Hanura, PKS, Golkar, PPP, Demokrat, dan Gerindra. (46 kursi) | 50 | 92 % | 8 % |
| 5 | Buton Regency | Samsu Umar Abdul Samiun-La Bakri | Demokrat, PKB, NasDem, PKS, PBB, Golkar, dan PAN (20 kursi) | 25 | 80 % | 20 % |

15 Persentase ini didasarkan pada jumlah perolehan kursi partai politik di DPRD di masing-masing daerah pada pemilu legislatif sebelumnya.

16 Pasal 40 Ayat (1) Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2016 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2014 Tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati, Dan Walikota Menjadi Undang-Undang, menentukan bahwa: “Partai Politik atau gabungan partai politik dapat mendaftarkan pasangan calon jika telah memenuhi persyaratan perolehan paling sedikit 20% (dua puluh persen) dari jumlah kursi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah atau 25% (dua puluh lima persen) dari akumulasi perolehan suara sah dalam pemilihan umum anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah di daerah yang bersangkutan”.

17 Persentase ini didasarkan pada jumlah perolehan kursi partai politik di DPRD di masing-masing daerah pada pemilu legislatif sebelumnya.

| | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---|---|----|-------|-------|
| 6 | Tambrauw Regency | Gabriel Asem – Mesak Metusala Yekwam | NasDem, PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, Gerindra, PKS, PKB, dan Hanura (19 kursi) | 20 | 95 % | 5 % |
| 7 | Landak Regency | Karolin Margret Natasa - Herculanus Heriadi | PDI Perjuangan, Nasdem, Golkar, Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKB, dan Hanura (32 kursi) | 35 | 91,4% | 8,6 % |
| 8 | Sorong City | Ec Lamberthus Jitmau – Hj. Pahima Iskandar | Demokrat, Golkar, PDIP, NasDem, PAN, Gerindra, PKB, dan Hanura (27 kursi) | 30 | 90 % | 10 % |
| 9 | TebingTinggi City | Umar Zunaidi Hasibuan dan Oki Doni Siregar | NasDem, Demokrat, Hanura, Gerindra, PKB, Golkar, PDIP, dan PPP. (19 Kursi) | 25 | 76 % | 24 % |

Source: processed from the KPU website and other sources, 14 January 2023.

Based on the table above, it can be seen that the support of political parties for a single candidate in the 2017 simultaneous local elections has increased dramatically compared to the 2015 single candidate. For a single candidate in the 2017 regional elections, political party support was above 50%. If based on the opportunities of other candidates, out of 9 (nine) regions with a single candidate, only 2 (two) regions still have opportunities for other candidates, namely the Regional Election of Buton and the Election of the Tebing Tinggi City. The rest, the support of political parties for a single candidate was majority. Likewise the single candidate in the 2018 simultaneous local elections. It showed the same tendency as the 2017 single candidate. More details can be seen in the following table.

Table 3: Political party support for a single candidate in 2018

| No | Regency/ City | Name of Candidate Pair | Political parties Supporters | Number of DPRD seats | % Support ¹⁸ | Remaining support |
|----|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Prabumulih City | Ridho Yahya - Andriansyah Fikri | Demokrat, Nasdem, PDIP, PAN, Gerindra, Golkar, PKS, PKPI, PKB, dan PBB (25 kursi) | 25 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 2 | Lebak Regency | Iti Octavia - Ade Sumardi | Demokrat, Hanura, Golkar, Nasdem, PPP, PKB, PKS, Gerindra, PAN, PBB, dan PDI-P. (50 Kursi) | 50 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 3 | Tangerang Regency | Ahmad Zaki Iskandar- Mad Romli | Golkar, PDIP, Nasdem, Hanura, Demokrat, PKS, PKB, PPP, Gerindra, PAN, PKPI, dan PBB (50 kursi) | 50 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 4 | Tangerang City | Arief R Wismansyah- Sachrudin | Nasdem, PPP, Demokrat, PAN, PDIP, Hanura, PKB, PKS, Gerindra, dan Golkar. (10 partai) 50 kursi | 50 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 5 | Pasuruan Regency | Irsyad Yusuf - Mujib Imron | NasDem, PKB, Golkar, PKS PPP, Gerindra, PDIP, dan Demokrat (49 kursi) | 50 | 98 % | 2 % |
| 6 | Enrekang Regency (Sulsel) | Muslimin Bando – Asman | PDIP, PAN, Golkar, Gerindra, Demokrat, Nasdem, dan Hanura. (26 Kursi) | 30 | 86,7% | 13,3 % |

18 Persentase ini didasarkan pada jumlah perolehan kursi partai politik di DPRD di masing-masing daerah pada pemilu legislatif sebelumnya.

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|----|-----------------------------------|--|---|----|-------|--------|
| 7 | Minahasa Regency Tenggara (Sulut) | James Sumendap - Yoke Legi | PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, Gerindra, PAN, Hanura, PPP, PKPI (24 Kursi) | 25 | 96% | 4 % |
| 8 | Tapin Regency (Kalsel) | HM Arifin Arpan-Syafuddin Noor | Golkar, Demokrat, PKS, PDIP, PAN, Gerindra, PKB, PPP.(25 kursi) | 25 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 9 | Mamasa Regency (Sulbar) | Ramlan - Martinus | PKB, Golkar, PKPI, PKS, Nasdem, PDIP, Demokrat, PBB, PPP, dan PAN. (25 kursi) | 30 | 83,3% | 16,7 % |
| 10 | Jayawijaya Regency | John Richar Banua - Marthen Yogobi | PKS, Hanura, PAN, PDIP, Golkar, PKB, Demokrat, PKPI, Nasdem, dan PBB (26 kursi) | 30 | 86,7% | 13,3 % |
| 11 | Padang Lawas Utara Regency | Andar Amin Harahap - Hariro Harahap | Golkar, PDIP, Gerindra, Hanura, PAN, PPP, NasDem, PKPI, PKB, Demokrat dan PBB. (30 kursi) | 30 | 100% | 0 % |
| 12 | Puncak Regency | Willem Wandik dan Alus Murib | PDIP, Hanura, PKS, Nasdem, PKB, Gerindra, Golkar, PKPI (23 Kursi) | 25 | 92 % | 8 % |
| 13 | Mamberamo Tengah Regency | R. Ham Pagawak - Yonas Kenelak | Demokrat, PKS, PBB, Gerindra, PAN, PDIP, PKPI (20 kursi) | 20 | 100% | 0 % |
| 14 | Bone (Sulsel) Regency | Andi Fashar Mahdin Padjalangi-Ambo Dalle | Nasdem, Hanura, PKB, Gerindra, PBB, PPP, PDIP, PKS, Demokrat, PAN, Golkar (45 kursi) | 45 | 100 % | 0 % |
| 15 | Deli Serdang Regency | Ashari Tambunan-Ali Yusuf Siregar | PDIP, Golkar, PAN, PKB, PKS, PKPI, Demokrat, Hanura, PPP, NasDem, dan Gerindra (50 kursi) | 50 | 100% | 0 % |
| 16 | Makasar City | Munafri Arifuddin-Andi Rahmatika Dewi | Golkar, NasDem, PDIP, Gerindra, PAN, PKS, PPP, PKB, PBB dan PKPI. (43 kursi) | 50 | 86% | 14 % |

Sumber data: diolah dari Website KPU dan sumber lainnya, 15 Januari 2023.

In the table above, it can be seen that the coalition of political parties carrying a single candidate continued to experience a significant increase. The size of the coalition of political parties was above 80%. If the support of a political party for a single candidate in all regions exceeded 80%, no other candidates would certainly appear through the political party channel. This is because the support of the remaining political parties no longer meets the nomination threshold. In fact, out of 16 (sixteen) regions with a single candidate Pilkada, 10 (ten) regions received 100% full support from political parties that had seats in the DPRD. Likewise with the 2020 single candidate. The support of political parties was also in a fairly large category for a single candidate.

Table 4: Political party support for a single candidate for 2020

| No | Regency/ City | Spouse Name Single Candidate | Bearers of Political Parties | Chairs of Bearers | Chair of DPRD | Percentage of Support (%) |
|----|--------------------|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Humbang Hasundutan | Dosman Banjarnahor - Oloan P. Nababan | PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar, Demokrat, Hanura, Nasdem, Perindo, dan PSI. | 25 | 25 | 100 |
| 2 | Kota Gunungsitoli | Lakhomizaro Zebua - Sowa'a Laoli | PDIP, Demokrat, PAN, Gerindra, Golkar, PKPI, Perindo, dan Hanura. | 23 | 25 | 92 |

| | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|---|---|----|----|------|
| 3 | Kota Pematangsiantar | Asner Silalahi - Susanti Dewayani | PDIP, Gerindra, Nasdem, Golkar, PAN, Hanura, PKPI, dan Demokrat. | 30 | 30 | 100 |
| 4 | Kab.Pasaman | Benny Utama - Sabar AS | PKS, PDIP, Golkar, Demokrat, PKB, PAN, PPP, dan Nasdem. | 29 | 35 | 82,9 |
| 5 | Ogan Komering Ulu | Kuryana Azis - Johan Anuar | PAN Gerindra, PKB, PDIP, PKPI, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, Demokrat, PPP, dan PBB. | 31 | 35 | 88,6 |
| 6 | Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan | Popo Ali Martopo - Sholehien Abuasir | Gerindra, PKB, PDIP, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, PPP, Perindo, PAN, PBB, Demokrat, dan Hanura. | 40 | 40 | 100% |
| 7 | Bengkulu Utara | Mian - Arie Septia Adinata | Gerindra, PKB, PDIP, PKPI, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, PAN, PPP, dan Hanura. | 27 | 30 | 90 |
| 8 | Boyolali | Mohammad Said Hidayat - Wahyu Irawan | PDIP | 35 | 45 | 77,8 |
| 9 | Grobogan | Sri Sumarni - Bambang Pujiyanto | Gerindra, PKS, PKB, PAN, Hanura, PPP, Golkar, Demokrat, Berkarya, dan PDIP. | 50 | 50 | 100 |
| 10 | Kebumen | Arif Sugiyanto - Ristawati Purwaningsih | PPP, Gerindra, PKB, PDIP, Demokrat, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, dan PAN. | 50 | 50 | 100 |
| 11 | Kota Semarang | Hendar Prihadi - Hevearita Gunaryanti Rahayu | PKS, Gerindra, PDIP, Demokrat, PAN, PKB, Nasdem, Golkar, dan PSI. | 50 | 50 | 100 |
| 12 | Kab.Sragen | Kusdinar Untung Yuni Sukowati - Suroto | Golkar, PDIP, PAN, PKB, dan Nasdem. | 28 | 45 | 62,2 |
| 13 | Wonosobo | Afif Nurhidayat - Muhammad Albar | Demokrat, Hanura, PKB, PDIP, Golkar, PAN, dan Nasdem. | 35 | 45 | 77,8 |
| 14 | Kediri | Hanindhito Himawan Pramana - Dewi Mariya Ulfa | Gerindra, PKB, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, PAN, PPP, Demokrat, dan PDIP. | 50 | 50 | 100 |
| 15 | Ngawi | Ony Anwar Harsono - Dwi Rianto Jatmiko | Golkar, PDIP, PKB, PKS, Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, Nasdem, Hanura, dan PPP. | 45 | 45 | 100 |
| 16 | Badung | I Nyoman Giri Prasta - I Ketut Suiasa | Golkar, PDIP, dan Demokrat. | 37 | 40 | 92,5 |
| 17 | Sumbawa Barat | W.Musyafirin - Fud Syaifuddin | Gerindra, PKB, PDIP, Nasdem, Golkar, PKS, PPP, PKPI, dan PAN. | 21 | 25 | 84 |
| 18 | Kota Balikpapan | Rahmad Mas'ud - Thohari Aziz | Gerindra, PKB, PKS, PPP, Demokrat, Perindo, Golkar, dan PDIP. | 40 | 45 | 88,9 |
| 19 | Kutai Kartanegara | Edi Damansyah - Rendi Solihin | Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PDIP, PKB, PPP, PKS, Hanura, Nasdem, dan Perindo. | 45 | 45 | 100 |

| | | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|--|---|----|----|-----|
| 20 | Gowa | Adnan Purichta Ichsan - Abdul Rauf Magalanni | PDIP, Nasdem, Golkar, Perindo, PKS, PPP, PAN, Demokrat, PKB, dan Gerindra. | 45 | 45 | 100 |
| 21 | Soppeng | Kaswadi Razak - Luthfi Halide | PDIP, Gerindra, Golkar, PPP, Nasdem, Demokrat, dan PKB. | 30 | 30 | 100 |
| 22 | Mamuju Tengah | M. Aras T - Muh. Amin Jasa | Gerindra, Nasdem, PDIP, PKB, Golkar, Perindo, PAN, PKS, Demokrat, dan Hanura. | 25 | 25 | 100 |
| 23 | Manokwari Selatan | Markus Waran - Wempie Welly Rengkung | Nasdem, Perindo, PDIP, PKPI, Golkar, dan Hanura. | 16 | 20 | 80 |
| 24 | Pegunungan Arfak | Yosias Saroy - Marinus Mandacan | PDIP, PKB, Golkar, PKS, Nasdem, Perindo, PAN, PPP, PKPI, dan Hanura. | 17 | 20 | 85 |
| 25 | Raja Ampat | Abdul Faris Umlati - Oredeko I. Burdam | Golkar, Gerindra, Nasdem, PAN, PKS, Demokrat | 18 | 20 | 90 |

Source: data processed from the KPU website and other sources, 17 January 2023.

Based on the table above, out of 25 single candidate regions, only 4 (four) regions still allowed other candidates to advance, namely, Boyolali Regency, Sragen Regency, Wonosobo Regency, and South Manokwari Regency. The rest did not allow other candidates to come forward. In fact, in 11 (eleven) regions, political party support for a single candidate was absolute, namely 100%. Thus, the formed coalition no longer cared about the similarity of party platforms/ideologies. All political parties can unite in the interest of winning a single candidate. Related to this phenomenon, if the process of accumulating political party support for a single candidate is due to the absence of another candidate, or because a single candidate is the most ideal type of leader according to the views of the public and the party, then the existence of a single candidate is not a problem, because its existence has been legalized in election law. However, if the accumulation of political party support is a strategy to make it easier for one of the candidates to win, then the existence of a single candidate Pilkada is a threat to democracy at the local level. Hermawan Sulistyو explained,¹⁹ there were at least 8 (eight) criteria for an election to be called democratic. *First* is the recognition of universal voting rights. *Second* is a guarantee that the aspirations of a plural society will be accommodated. *Third* is the available political recruitment process for democratic candidates. *Fourth* is the freedom of voters to discuss and decide their choices. *Fifth* is an independent selection committee. *Sixth* is the freedom of candidates to compete healthily. *Seventh* is the count of votes to be carried out honestly. *Eighth* is the neutral bureaucracy.

3.1.2 Pragmatic Coalition of political parties²⁰

As revealed by Endah Yuli Ekowati,²¹ that of the number of candidates participating in the Pilkada, in general, they were supported by a political party or a coalition of political parties formed on the basis of an agreement with the political parties. Coalitions were built without considering ideological similarities. This is because, the reality is that coalition membership is not always parties that have the same platform, but parties with different platforms can join a coalition in carrying a single candidate. The pragmatism of political parties is not only seen in the coalition process but also seen in the candidates that are promoted by only prioritizing popularity and electability. Christian Dior Simbolon²² mentioned that currently political parties are starting to set aside their regeneration system and ideology, the proof is that many candidate pairs are proposed but are not cadres from the party concerned. The party's goal is very easy to read, it's just how to win and gain power.

19 Sulistyو Hermawan, *Kekerasan Politik Dalam Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: KIPP Indonesia, 2000), 3-4.

20 Menurut Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (Kemdikbud.go.id), kata "pragmatis" diartikan yaitu: bersifat praktis dan berguna bagi umum; bersifat mengutamakan segi kepraktisan dan kegunaan (kemanfaatan). sehingga, penggunaan kata pragmatis dalam penulisan ini dimaknai bahwa koalisi yang dibentuk/terbentuk lebih mementingkan keterpilihan calon dari pada pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang bersifat ideologis.

21 Ekowati, "Pragmatisme Politik: Antara Koalisi, Pencalonan Dan Calon Tunggal Dalam Pilkada."

22 *Ibid.*

Many parties do not carry out their cadre function properly.²³ Even if this is done, in practice, not a few party leaders during regional elections prefer other candidates who are more popular and have a high level of electability.²⁴ As revealed by Titi Anggraeni, regional election contestation is no longer positioned as a momentum to test parties through cadres and structures but only a matter of profit and loss so that pragmatism makes political parties compromise with candidates with high electability and feel no need to bear candidates. Ideally, a coalition of political parties in nominating candidate pairs is based on a common ideology, vision, and mission²⁶ so that, when the candidate is elected, it will be easier to agree on the policies that will be realized. However, in reality, the coalitions formed are very random, so even parties with different ideologies are often found in one coalition. This condition actually shows the public that political parties are very pragmatic and transactional either in selecting coalition “friends” or in determining the candidates to be born.

Asep Nurjaman grouped political parties into four ideologies which, Islam, Religious Nationalist, Secular Nationalist, and Christian. The grouping can be seen in the following table.

Table 6: Political Party Ideology Mapping in the 2004 Election

| Ideology | Political parties |
|-----------------------|--|
| Islam | Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR), Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (PPNUI), dan Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). |
| Religious Nationalist | Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), , Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI), Partai Demokrat, Partai Merdeka, Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB), Partai Patriot Pancasila, Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PPDK), dan Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD). |
| Secular Nationalists | Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (PBSD), Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), PNI Marhaenisme, Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (PNBK), Partai Pelopor, dan Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PPDK). |
| Christian | Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS). |

Source: Asep Nurjaman, 23 March 2023.

The classification of political parties as stated by Asep Nurjaman above, if it is related to the pattern of coalitions built by political parties in Pilkada areas with a single candidate from 2015 to 2020, the coalitions built as shown in the table. 1 - table.4, looks mixed jumbled and cannot be identified thus strengthening the argument that the coalition that was built was only based on the interests of winning the Pilkada (pragmatic) alone, not based on a common principle or party ideology.

3.1.3 Practice of Bulk Party

If one looks closely, the single candidate for 2015 was only supported by a handful of political parties (the highest support was 38%). Apart from that, there were no other candidates who wanted to run. After the single candidate was legalized through Constitutional Court Decision No.100/PUU-XIII/2015, KPU Regulation No.14/2015, and Law No.10/2016, 2017, 2018, and 2020 single candidate experienced differences in terms of party support. The support of political parties has increased dramatically for a single candidate (compared between table 1 to table 4). Based on the author’s analysis, behind the phenomenon of increasing political party support for a single candidate, there is another phenomenon that accompanies it, namely the phenomenon of “bulk party”²⁷ by a single candidate. The author’s belief in the existence of this practice is

23 Rofi Aulia Rahman, Iwan Satriawan, and Marchethy Riwani Diaz, “Calon Tunggal Pilkada: Krisis Kepemimpinan Dan Ancaman Bagi Demokrasi,” *Jurnal Konstitusi* 19, no. 1 (2022): 47–72, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1913>.

24 Ekowati, “Pragmatisme Politik: Antara Koalisi, Pencalonan Dan Calon Tunggal Dalam Pilkada.”

25 Tony Yuri Rahmanto, “Calon Tunggal Dalam Perspektif Hak Memilih Dan Dipilih Di Provinsi Banten,” *Jurnal HAM* 9, no. 2 (2018): 103, <https://doi.org/10.30641/ham.2018.9.103-120>.

26 Safira Yuristianti, “Fenomena Calon Tunggal Dalam Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Kabupaten Pati 2017 (Studi Kasus: Sistem Rekrutmen Calon Oleh Partai Politik),” *Journal of Politic and Government Studies* 7, no. 2 (2018): 67–70, <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jpgs/article/view/20042>.

27 In this research, “bulk party” is defined as the action of one candidate by gaining the support of as many political parties as possible with the aim of blocking other candidates, so that it is easier for him to win.

supported by the fact that in several single candidate Pilkada regions, other candidates wanted to run, but failed because they did not meet the requirements for party support. This is in accordance with Bawaslu's research that in the 2018 Pilkada one of the causes was the practice of bulk party.²⁸ In fact, in some areas, there was a dispute over party support. At the very least, the following areas can be used as examples of the occurrence of party support, namely a single candidate in the Jayapura City Pilkada (2017), a single candidate in the Pati Regency Pilkada (2017), and a single candidate in the Makassar City Pilkada (2018).

In the Jayapura City Pilkada, since the opening of the registration period, there were three pairs of prospective candidates who had registered at the Jayapura City Election Commission, namely Benhur Tommy Manno - Rustan Saru, Abisai Rollo - Dipo Wibiwo, and Boy Markus Dawir-Nuralam.²⁹ Based on the results of the verification, it found dual support from the Golkar Party and PKPI. The Abisai Rollo-Dipo Wibiwo and Benhur Tommy Manno-Rustan Saru pairs both received recommendations from the Golkar Party. Meanwhile, the couple Boy Markus Dawir-Nuralam and the couple Benhur Tommy Manno - Rustan Saru both received support from PKPI. After verification, the KPU for Jayapura City determined that the legitimate support for the Golkar party was for the pair Benhur Tommy Manno -Rustan Saru and PKPI for the pair Boy Markus Dawir-Nuralam so the KPU for Jayapura City determined two candidates pairs, namely Boy Markus Dawir-Nuralam and Benhur Tommy Manno- Rustan Saru. However, the Benhur pair, Tommy Manno - Rustan Saru, challenged the Jayapura City Election Commission's decision to PT TUN Makasar, because they considered the PKPI party's support for the Boy Markus Dawir-Nuralam pair to be illegal. PT TUN Makasar granted and canceled the Jayapura City Election Commission's decision so that the legitimate PKPI support belonged to Benhur Tommy Manno-Rustan Saru. Jayapura City KPU made an appeal, but the Supreme Court (MA) rejected and upheld PT TUN Makasar's decision so that the Jayapura City Pilkada was only followed by Benhur Tommy Manno -Rustan Saru.

In the Pati Regency Pilkada, apart from the single candidate pair Haryanto-Syaiful Arifin, there was another candidate, named Budiono. Initially, Budiono was planned to be supported by two political parties, which were Nasdem Party and PKB. However, at the end of the registration, Budiono failed to get a recommendation from the Central Leadership Council (DPP) PKB because the recommendation was obtained by the Haryanto-Syaiful Arifin pair.³⁰ The efforts of the Haryanto-Syaiful Arifin pair to gain support from the DPP PKB could be seen as an effort to win over the support of political parties. Because even without the support of the PKB, the Haryanto-Syaiful Arifin pair met the support requirements.³¹ However, Haryanto-Syaiful Arifin was still trying to get a recommendation from the PKB DPP so Budiono failed to become a candidate because he did not meet the party support requirements.³² This fact was reinforced by a study conducted by Danny Widodo which stated that in Pati Regency there were actually many political party cadres who were qualified as candidates for regional head/vice regional head.³³ In the 2012 Pati Pilkada, 6 (six) pairs of candidates participated. According to Danny, there were actually many cadres in Pati Regency who had the potential and deserved to be born by political parties. Like the PDIP, it had several cadres including, Imam Suroso who was then a member of the DPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Endro Dwicahyono who was an administrator for the Central Java Regional Leadership Council (DPD) PDIP and had registered as a candidate for regent at the PDIP DPC Pati Regency.

28 Badan Pengawas Pemilu (BAWASLU), *Fenomena Calon Tunggal: Studi Kasus Pada Pilkada 2018 Di 16 Kabupaten/ Kota* (Badan Pengawas Pemilu, 2018).

29 Senalince Mara, "Demokrasi Kotak Kosong (Studi Kasus Pada Pemilukada Kota Jayapura Tahun 2017)," *Jurnal Civic Education: Media Kajian Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 2, no. 1 (2018): 54–64, <https://doi.org/10.36412/ce.v2i1.443>.

30 Prihatmono and Nugroho, "Pilkada Calon Tunggal di Kabupaten Pati Tahun 2017: Suatu Tinjauan Oligarkisme Partai Politik."

31 Data ini merupakan hasil wawancara dengan Budiono, Budiono merupakan bakal calon yang gagal maju dalam Pilkada Pati tahun 2017. Wawancara dilakukan melalui telepon seluler pada Sabtu 27 Juli 2019.

32 Asita Widyasari, Reyke Anggia Dewi, and Viera Mayasari Sri Rengganis, "Gerakan Politik Pendukung Kotak Kosong: Keterlibatan Civil Society Dalam Pilkada Kabupaten Pati Tahun 2017," *Jurnal PolGov* 1, no. 1 (2019): 89–119, <https://doi.org/10.22146/polgov.v1i1.48307>.

33 Danny Widodo Uji Prakoso, "Analisis Rekrutmen Dan Kaderisasi Partai Politik Pada Fenomena Calon Tunggal Petahana Studi Kasus : Pilkada Kabupaten Pati 2017," *Journal of Politic and Government Studies* 7, no. 2 (2017): 181–90, <https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/jpgs/article/view/20054>.

However, in the end, he followed the party's decision to nominate Haryanto-Arifin. The Golkar Party also had a cadre, Firman Subagyo, who at that time was a member of the House of Representatives Commission IV. Then, the Gerindra Party also had Sri Wulan who at that time was a member of Commission IV of the DPR RI. There was also Kartina Sukawati from the Democratic Party who was the Chairperson of the Democratic Faction of the Central Java DPRD and served as deputy regent for the 2006-2011 period. PKB had Budiono who was Haryanto's Deputy for the 2012-2017 period and was also the Chair of the Branch Leadership Council (DPC) PKB Syuro Board of Pati Regency. Even though each party had potential cadres, in reality, political party support still piled up on the Haryanto-Saiful Arifin pair.³⁴

In the Pilkada of Makassar City, at first, it was seen that one of the candidates had bought the support of a political party. Where the pair Munafri Arifuddin - Andi Rahmatika Dewi succeeded in gathering the support of 10 (ten) political parties (43 DPRD seats) or 86%. However, at that time there was no single candidate. This was because the incumbent candidate (Ramdhan Pomanto) has chosen to advance through the individual route in partnership with Indira Mulyasari Pramastuti. However, in the end, Ramdhan Pomanto-Indira Mulyasari Pramastuti were disqualified as candidate pairs because they were convicted of committing election violations based on PTUN Decision No.6/G/Pilkada/2018/PT.TUN.Mks and strengthened by Supreme Court Decision No.250 K/TUN /PILKADA/2018 so that the Makassar City Pilkada in 2018 was only followed by one pair of candidates (Munafri Arifuddin-Andi Rahmatika Dewi).³⁵ However, after voting, the Munafri Arifudin-Andi Rahmatika Dewi pair lost against an empty column³⁶ so the Makassar City Pilkada must be repeated in accordance with the applicable provisions. In the re-election, Ramdhan Pomanto's pair was superior to Munafri Arifuddin's pair. Based on reasonable reasoning, two reasons corroborate that a single candidate in the Pilkada of Makassar City has bought party support, namely; *First*, the actions of the Munafri candidate pair trying to thwart the incumbent candidate through reporting alleged campaign violations by the incumbent candidate to the local Bawaslu, which ended in the disqualification of the incumbent candidate through the Supreme Court Decision. *Second*, there is an attempt to request a review of Law No.10/2016 submitted by a single candidate before the re-election, which in essence requests that the Constitutional Court interpret the next re-election to only be followed by a single candidate with an empty column without any other new candidates.³⁷

Guided by the three Pilkada cases above, it is reasonable to say that behind the large support of political parties for a single candidate, one of the causes is the practice of bulk parties by a single candidate.³⁸ This practice, of course, is contrary to the principles of democratic elections. As disclosed by Hermawan Sulisty³⁹ whereas 2 (two) criteria out of 8 (eight) criteria, state that there must be a political recruitment process for democratic candidates and the freedom for candidates to compete fairly. Even so, not all single candidate supported by the majority of political parties can be assumed because of the practice of bulk parties. This is because in several areas a single candidate is supported by 100% of the party, such as in West Tulang Bawang Regency, no other candidates who are trying to run either from political parties or individuals.

34 Hasil wawancara penulis dengan beberapa pimpinan partai politik di Kabupaten Pati, di antaranya, Ketua DPC PDIP Kabupaten Pati Ali Badrudin, Ketua DPC PKB Kabupaten Pati Muhammadun, Ketua DPD Partai Gerindra Kabupaten Pati Hardi, Ketua DPC Partai Demokrat Kabupaten Pati Joni Kurnianto, yang pada umumnya menjelaskan bahwa dukungan terhadap pasangan Haryanto-Saiful Arifin karena dianggap berhasil pada periode sebelumnya, padahal Budiono merupakan wakil Haryanto periode 2012-2017. Wawancara dilakukan secara bersamaan di Gedung DPRD Kabupaten Pati dalam riset disertasi, Jum'at 26 Juli 2019.

35 Ayu Andira, "Fenomena Kolom Kosong Pada Pilkada Kota Makassar Tahun," *Siyasatuna* 1, no. 3 (2020): 500–508, <https://journal3.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/siyasatuna/article/view/19528>.

36 Ilham, "Fenomena Calon Tunggal Dalam Demokrasi Indonesia."

37 Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Nomor 31/PHP.GUB-XVI/2018 Tentang Penyelesaian Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Walikota Dan Wakil Walikota Makassar, Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan Tahun 2018.

38 Badan Pengawas Pemilu (BAWASLU), *Fenomena Calon Tunggal: Studi Kasus Pada Pilkada 2018 Di 16 Kabupaten/ Kota*.

39 Sulisty Hermawan, *Kekerasan Politik Dalam Pemilu 1999* (Jakarta: KIPP Indonesia, 2000), 3-4.

3.1.4 The number of costs to be borne by the candidate

The next phenomenon is the amount of money that must be paid by candidates to advance in Pilkada.⁴⁰ As revealed by the Director of Education and Community Services of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Giri Supradiono, that to be able to take part in regional elections, regional head candidates can spend Rp. 20 billion to Rp. 100 billion.⁴¹ Based on a survey conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) on the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) R&D study, a candidate for regent/mayor could cost between Rp. 20 billion to Rp. 30 billion. Meanwhile, the election for the governor/deputy governor could cost Rp. 20 billion to Rp. 100 billion. This was revealed by the regional head who stumbled on the KPK's sting operation (OTT).⁴²

There are several expense items that cause the large costs borne by prospective candidates.⁴³ *First*, costs to gain the support of political parties which are commonly called "political dowry". *Second*, campaign costs, such as costs for completing attributes (billboards, banners, t-shirts, and others), the success team, as well as the use of both print and electronic media. *Third*, consultation and survey fees through various consulting agencies and survey agencies. *Fourth*, money politics, which is still mostly practiced by candidates in the form of "dawn attacks", donations to public facilities such as places of worship and others. Then, the considerable cost is related to the placement of witnesses at the polling stations (TPS).⁴⁴

The phenomenon of the high costs that must be incurred by prospective candidates is certainly not in accordance with the principles of democratic elections. This is because the large political costs of candidates will have an impact on potential cadres who do not have adequate financial capabilities, and will not be able to nominate themselves. Another effect is that after the Pilkada, many regional heads have stumbled on corruption cases. This condition, of course, deviates from the ideal concept of holding Pilkada. Therefore, future regulatory changes must be able to anticipate this problem.

From some of the phenomena above, namely the increasing support of political parties for a single candidate, coalitions of political parties which are very pragmatic, the practice of bulk parties, and the large costs borne by candidates, are phenomena that do not reflect a democratic Pilkada. Because, some of these phenomena contain fraudulent practices (*fraud*), and injustice (*unfair*) to other prospective candidates. Therefore, this phenomenon must be addressed immediately so that it does not spread to the next Pilkada.

3.2 Arrangement Ideas

Guided by the phenomena previously described, the increase in the number of parties bearing a single candidate, the existence of strong indications of the practice of bulk parties by single candidate, the pragmatism of party coalitions, and the large costs borne by the candidates, the following structuring steps are needed.

3.2.1 Reduction of Party Nomination Threshold and Support Conditions for Single Candidate

As a strategy to deal with the large costs borne by prospective candidates, especially in obtaining a "ticket" for candidacy, it is necessary to make arrangements related to the requirements for carrying parties and the conditions for the support of single candidate.⁴⁵ This needs to be done because what makes the cost of

40 Ayu Lestari, Ridwan Ridwan, and Iza Rumesten RS, "Faktor Penyebab Kehadiran Calon Tunggal Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah," *Simbur Cahaya* 25, no. 2 (2019): 249–62, <https://doi.org/10.28946/sc.v25i2.333>.

41 Samuel Risal, "Sumber Daya Alam Dalam Pusaran Pilkada Serentak," *Jurnal Kemudi* 2, no. 17 (2020): 136, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31629/kemudi.v6i02.3948>.

42 Adhi Iman Sulaiman, "Refleksi Pilkada Dan Model Kepemimpinan Kepala Daerah," *Jurnal Ilmu Politik Dan Pemerintahan* 1, no. 2 (2013): 119–38, <https://doi.org/10.37058/jipp.v1i2.2257>.

43 Delia Widianti, "Mahar Politik Dan Korupsi Sistemik," n.d., <https://www.puskapol.ui.ac.id/opini/mahar-politik-dan-korupsi-sistemik.html>.

44 Mulida Hayati and Rico Septian Noor, "Korelasi Pilkada Langsung Dan Korupsi Di Indonesia," *MORALITY : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 6, no. 2 (2020): 102–15, <https://doi.org/10.52947/morality.v6i2.174>.

45 Terkait mahar partai politik, sudah terdapat larangannya dalam Pasal 47 ayat (1) UU No.1/2015 yang menyebutkan; *Partai Politik atau gabungan Partai Politik dilarang menerima imbalan dalam bentuk apapun pada proses pencalonan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Walikota*. Permasalahannya adalah masih lemahnya penegakan hukum terkait mahar politik ini.

the candidate high is due to the tight access to candidates both through political parties and from individuals. Referring to the provisions of Law No. 32/2004, regarding the requirements for political parties to nominate pairs of regional head candidates (nomination threshold) is a minimum of 15% of seats in the DPRD or 15% of valid votes in the last legislative elections. These provisions are regulated in Article 59 paragraph (2), namely: “Political parties or coalitions of political parties as referred to in paragraph (1) can register pairs of candidates if they meet the requirements for acquiring at least 15% (fifteen percent) of the number of DPRD seats or 15 % (fifteen percent) of the accumulated valid votes acquired in the General Election for DPRD members in the area concerned”.

These provisions, in practice, are not too burdensome for political parties in nominating candidate pairs. This is evidenced, that during the validity period of Law No.32/2004, there was never a shortage of candidate pairs in the Pilkada administration. Even in some areas, there are 5 (five) to 6 (six) pairs of candidates. However, this situation underwent a drastic change after Law No.32/2004 was replaced with Law No.1/2015. In the new law, the threshold requirement for regional head candidates has increased as seen in Article 40 paragraph (1) of Law No. 1/2015, namely: “Political parties or coalitions of political parties can register candidates if they have met the minimum acquisition requirements 20% (twenty percent) of the total DPRD seats or 25% (twenty five percent) of the accumulated valid votes acquired in the general election for DPRD members in the area concerned.

Based on the provisions of the article above, there is an increase in the threshold for candidacy for regional heads, namely 5% (five percent) for seats and 10% for valid votes in legislative elections. These provisions have resulted in fewer and fewer political parties being able to independently nominate regional head candidates without forming a coalition with other parties.⁴⁶ According to the author, this policy is one of the reasons for the decline in the number of candidate pairs in a number of regions during the 2015-2020 simultaneous local elections. Therefore, as a policy to anticipate the growth of Pilkada with a single candidate, it is necessary to conduct a review regarding the threshold for the nomination of regional heads by political parties. At the very least, the nomination threshold percentage is restored in accordance with the provisions that were once in effect in Law No.32/2004, which is 15% (fifteen percent) both based on party seat ownership in DPRD and based on vote acquisition in the previous legislative election.

Then, the terms of support for single candidate also seem to have increased from the previous provisions. The increase in support requirements occurred in Law No.8/2015 as can be seen in the following table.

Table 7: Comparison of support requirements for single candidate for regents/deputy regents and Mayor/Deputy Mayor in several laws and regulations.

| Total population | Minimum Support Requirements for Single candidateCandidates | | | |
|---------------------|---|--------------|--------------|---|
| | UU No.12/2008 | UU No.1/2015 | UU No.8/2015 | Law No.10/2016 Based on the total population in the DPT |
| -250.000 | 6,5 % | 6,5 % | 10% | 10% |
| >250.000-500.000 | 5% | 5% | 8,5% | 8,5% |
| >500.000-1.000.000. | 4% | 4% | 7,5% | 7,5% |
| >1.000.000 | 3% | 3% | 6,5% | 6,5% |

Source: processed from several laws and regulations, 16 February 2023.

46 Kebijakan menaikkan ambang batas pencalonan ini, sesungguhnya juga berdampak pada bakal calon. Sebab, di sebagian besar daerah hanya sedikit partai politik yang mencapai ambang batas pencalonan sehingga membutuhkan banyak partai untuk bergabung dalam koalisi. Semakin banyak partai politik yang tergabung dalam koalisi, maka semakin berat pula beban yang bakal ditanggung calon untuk memperoleh dukungan, baik di tingkat daerah maupun di tingkat pusat. Beban tersebut, akan semakin bertambah, jika setiap partai politik mensyaratkan adanya “mahar politik” untuk bisa keluarnya surat rekomendasi. Hal ini, selain akan berdampak pada minimnya calon kepala daerah, juga berdampak pada perilaku kepala daerah setelah terpilih seperti melakukan korupsi, jual beli jabatan dan lainnya. Lihat: Teguh Ilham and Riky Fajar Sujatmiko, “Analisis Fenomena Pasangan Calon Tunggal Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Di Kabupaten Grobogan Tahun 2020,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Bhakti Praja* 12, no. 1 (2022): 1–11, <https://doi.org/10.33701/jiwbp.v12i1.2459>.

Based on the table above, it can be seen that the requirements for supporting single candidate have become even more stringent with the issuance of Law No.8/2015. This, of course, will result in smaller opportunities for single candidate in the Pilkada. Therefore, the requirement for support for single candidate needs to be returned to the provisions of Law No.12/2008 or Law No.1/2015 based on the number of voters using their right to vote, not the number of residents registered in the permanent voters list (DPT). This aims to maintain equality between candidates running through political parties and single candidate. This is in accordance with what was stated by Eric Barendt,⁴⁷ that five principles must be met by a democratic election, namely; (1) regular, (2) free, (3) equal, (4) secret, and 5) the authority of the court to uphold these principles. The third point, namely the principle of equality in the form of equal treatment between candidates running through political parties and single candidate must be balanced. This principle is very relevant as a reference in strengthening this idea. With the provisions currently in force, the conditions for the support of single candidate are far more stringent than the threshold requirements for the nomination of political parties. Therefore, the policy of relaxing the threshold requirements for party nominations and the support requirements for single candidate will affect the financial burden of prospective regional head candidates. If through a political party, there is a tariff or “political dowry” applied by the party, prospective candidates can easily choose alternative single candidate.

3.2.2 Organizing Coalitions of Political Parties

As a strategy to avoid bulk political party, it is necessary to organize coalitions of political parties carrying candidates. At the very least, two things must be done. *First*, a coalition of political parties must already exist before recruiting potential candidates. This is because when one examines the provisions in the Pilkada Law which regulate the mechanism for nominating regional heads, it can be concluded that it is the political parties that play an active role in finding prospective candidates who then register them with the regional KPU. As the editor of Article 40 paragraph (1) of Law No.1/2015 states: “*Political parties or coalitions of political parties can register candidates if they have met the requirements for obtaining at least 20% (twenty percent) of the number of DPRD seats or 25% (two twenty-five percent) of the accumulated valid votes in the general election for DPRD members in the area concerned.*” Thus, this provision can be understood, that before conducting a selection of prospective candidates, they must first fulfill the threshold requirements for the nomination of regional heads. If these conditions have not been met, then the political party must determine which party it should form a coalition with.

Based on this logic, in terms of selecting candidates for regional head candidates, a coalition of political parties should have been formed before determining potential candidates. This step is very important so that the support of political parties is not concentrated on one candidate. Political parties are still given the freedom to form coalitions, but in terms of numbers, they are limited. This coalition of political parties needs to be approved by the KPU before conducting screening of prospective candidates as a control so that opportunities are opened for other candidates. KPU should be given the authority not to approve the coalition if the coalition does not comply with the applicable provisions. This policy really needs to be enforced in order to avoid practices that are not ‘healthy’ which can harm the democratic values of the Pilkada. Candidates who have sufficient financial capacity, they are usually more dominant in determining the political party that will be chosen to carry them. Thus, other candidates lose the opportunity to participate in the Pilkada election.

Second, limiting the number of coalition parties. Guided by the single candidate phenomenon that occurred in 2017, 2018, and 2020, it shows that there is a large coalition of political parties formed to nominate regional head/deputy regional head candidates. This situation, of course, is not in accordance with the principles of democratic elections which guarantee the right of every citizen to vote and be elected as a regional head/deputy regional head through political party channels. One reason for the high support of political parties for regional head/deputy regional head candidate pairs is due to the absence of provisions in the Pilkada law which regulate the maximum limit of political party support in nominating candidate pairs. Legislators so far have always assumed that regional elections are always attended by more than 2 (two) candidates. This can be seen, in the several changes to the provisions of the Pilkada laws and regulations, which always lead to efforts to

47 Gaffar Janedjri M, *Demokrasi Dan Pemilu Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 2013), 25.

exacerbate the requirements for both the requirements for political parties as bearers and the requirements for the candidates themselves.

The absence of rules regarding the maximum limit for party coalitions supporting regional head candidates can open up opportunities for anyone to cheat by buying up political party support as a strategy to make it easier to win so that it leaves no chance for other candidates to advance through political party channels. The phenomenon of bulk party has been clearly seen in several regional elections for a single candidate as previously described. Therefore, Pilkada regulations must be designed in such a way that the elected regional head/deputy regional head has truly gone through a democratic process. As an idea from the results of the study in this study, it is very necessary to limit the number of political parties that carry candidates for regional head/deputy regional head based on the following provisions:

If in an area there is not a single political party that meets the threshold requirements for regional head nomination, then the political parties form a coalition with a maximum limit of 50% (fifty percent) based on DPRD seat ownership or the accumulation of valid votes acquired in legislative elections.

If in an area there are political parties that meet the regional head nomination threshold but less than 50%, then coalitions are still possible as long as the size of the coalition is not more than 50% (fifty percent).

If in an area there is a political party that meets the regional head nomination threshold and exceeds 50% of the seats/votes acquired, then that party is no longer allowed to form a coalition with other political parties.

Coalitions of political parties are advised to pay attention to the similarity of party ideological platforms. Thus, the coalition that is formed is based on the similarity of vision and mission, not based solely on pragmatic interests.

As for the consideration of the maximum limit of the coalition of supporting parties of 50%, the aim is to provide opportunity and justice for other candidates to advance through the political party route. This is in line with the third principle put forward by Hermawan Sulisty, ⁴⁸ i.e. there is a democratic candidate recruitment process available. This principle, at least guarantees that the recruitment of prospective candidates is carried out fairly, there is equal opportunity and equal treatment for every citizen. In addition, the above strategy also aims to ensure that the DPRD's supervisory function continues to run effectively according to the principle of checks and balances that must be established between the regional head and the DPRD. ⁴⁹

3.2.3 Setting the conditions for the election of a single candidate

In the theory of popular sovereignty, the people are in a noble and high position in a democratic country. ⁵⁰ Therefore, a country can be called implementing a democratic government system if the administration of the

48 Sulisty Hermawan, *Kekerasan Politik Dalam Pemilu 1999*, Op.Cit, 3-4.

49 Merujuk pada penelitian disertasi penulis pada Program Doktor Ilmu Hukum (PDIH) Fakultas Hukum Universitas Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta yang berjudul *Fenomena Calon Tunggal yang didukung mayoritas partai politik dan Implikasinya terhadap pengawasan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD)* dengan lokasi penelitian di Kabupaten Pati dan Kabupaten Tulang Bawang Barat. Hasil penelitian memperlihatkan bahwa dukungan mayoritas partai politik atas calon tunggal berakibat melemahnya daya kritis fraksi-fraksi partai politik bila dibandingkan sebelum Pilkada calon tunggal. Penelitian tersebut mengkomparasikan 60 jenis pandangan fraksi antara sebelum dengan setelah Pilkada calon tunggal. Oleh sebab itu, gagasan besaran koalisi maksimal 50% mempertimbangkan efektifitas pengawasan DPRD pasca Pilkada, karena disain sistem pemerintahan daerah antara kepala daerah dan DPRD harus berjalan sesuai mekanisme *checks and balances*.

50 Tanjung and Saraswati, "Calon Tunggal Pilkada Kurangi Kualitas Demokrasi." sehingga dapat menghilangkan monopoli individu atau kelompok pemodal terhadap persyaratan dukungan calon kepala daerah. Kata kunci: pemilihan kepala daerah; calon tunggal; demokrasi. ABSTRACT Philosophically, regional head elections are the implementation of people's sovereignty to be elected and vote in a democratic election process. There has been an increase in the number of regional elections with a single candidate. This research discusses the only candidate in the election of regional heads based on the Constitutional Court Decision Number 100/ PUU-XIII/2015. According to researchers, the decision of the constitutional court needs to be addressed by the stakeholders that involved keeping the election process going on democratically. This study is non-doctrinal research. The latest facts about the election of a regional head with a single candidate need to be guarded so that the polls will continue democratically. This research concludes that a single candidate in the local head election requires an appropriate legal construction (not left aside

country is guided by the will and desires of the people.⁵¹ Moh. Mahfud MD said that democracy as the basis of state life implies that at the last level, the people are the decision makers regarding key issues in their lives, including in assessing state policies because these policies determine the fate of the people.⁵² This opinion is highly correlated with the system of determining a single elected candidate. If a single candidate is indeed a leader that the wider community really wants, then there is no reason to call it an undemocratic election. Therefore, a regulatory strategy is needed that can guarantee that the single elected candidate truly has strong legitimacy from the public. Based on Article 54D of Law No.10/2016, paragraph (1) states that “*Provincial KPU or Regency/Municipal KPU determines the elected pair of candidates in the selection of 1 (one) pair of candidates as referred to in Article 54C if they get more than 50% of the votes (fifty percent) of the valid votes. While Paragraph (2) states: “If the vote acquisition of a pair of candidates is less than as referred to in paragraph (1), the pair of candidates who lose the election may nominate again in the next election.”* Based on these provisions, a single candidate pair will be declared as the elected candidate if they obtain more than 50% (fifty percent) of the votes. According to the author, these conditions for being elected do not guarantee the level of legitimacy of a single candidate if they are not linked to the level of voter turnout who exercises their rights on voting day.

There are several single candidate whose vote acquisition was very low when it was based on the number of voters registered in the DPT. For example, the vote acquisition of a single candidate in Jayapura City, only received 115,996 votes.⁵³ The voter turnout rate in that area was also classified as very low, namely 44.55% (forty four point fifty five percent). That is, more voters did not use their right to vote than voters who did. Of the 308,775 voters registered in the DPT, only 115,996 supported a single candidate in Jayapura City. If percentage, a single candidate only received 37.57% of the number of voters registered in the DPT. This percentage shows how weak the legitimacy of regional heads is as a result of the election of a single candidate in Jayapura City.

Therefore, it is necessary to rationalize the percentage of the vote acquisition of the candidates and the level of voter turnout as the basis for determining the elected candidate in the Pilkada with a single candidate. If voter turnout is low, then the vote acquisition requirement for the election of a single candidate is increased. Vice versa, if voter turnout is high, then the candidate’s vote acquisition requirements are lowered.

Table 7. Rationalization of the conditions for being elected as a Single Candidate with the level of Voter Turnout

| No | Voter Turnout (%) | The minimum limit for CT votes (%) |
|----|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | 0-25 | > 90 |
| 2 | > 25-50 | > 80 |
| 3 | > 50-75 | > 70 |
| 4 | > 75-100 | > 60 |

Processed 14 January 2023.

Based on the table above, the determination of the selected Single Candidate (CT) refers to the type of absolute majority⁵⁴ that is adjusted to the level of voter participation, in contrast to the provisions stipulated in Article 54D of Law No.10/2016. If the vote acquisition of a single candidate does not meet the conditions contained in the table above, the consequence must be a re-election by opening up opportunities for other candidates to participate. It is necessary to rationalize the conditions for selecting a single candidate as listed in

51 Yuhana Abdy, *Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Pasca Perubahan UUD 1945* (Bandung: Fokusmedia, 2009), 28.

52 MD Moh. Mahfud, *Hukum Dan Pilar-Pilar Demokrasi* (Yogyakarta: Gama Media, 1999), 7.

53 Lihat https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/t2/papua/kota_jayapura.

54 Suara terbanyak mutlak (*absolute majority*) adalah penentuan keputusan atau pemenang didasarkan atas perolehan suara yang melebihi dari separuh jumlah pemilih (50% + 1), sementara suara terbanyak sederhana (*simple majority*) adalah penentuan keputusan atau pemenang didasarkan atas perolehan suara yang tidak mencapai separuh dari jumlah pemilih (bisa di bawah 50%) asalkan memperoleh suara terbanyak dibanding pilihan yang lain. Dalam mekanisme pengambilan keputusan semacam ini, biasanya memperhatikan kuorum dari keanggotaan suatu lembaga (seperti parlemen atau kongres), sehingga dalam praktik Pilkada, merupakan hal yang wajar jika penentuan calon tunggal terpilih dikaitkan pula dengan persentase pemilihnya.

the table above, with the hope that; *First*, a single candidate pair must truly be recognized for his/her character in society. A single candidate must be someone who is liked by the people, not a candidate who is running because of fraudulent tricks. *Second*, it is used as a strategy to strengthen the legitimacy of a single candidate pair. The minimum percentage of votes acquired as a condition for electing a single candidate if it is not adjusted to the level of voter turnout, will have an impact on the weak legitimacy of the elected regional head. This needs to be taken into consideration because the election rate with a single candidate voter turnout tends to decrease.⁵⁵ *Third*, it is an effort to avoid the bulk political party support by one of the candidates. By setting the pattern of conditions for selecting a single candidate in the table above, at least it will make regional head/deputy regional head candidates think again about bulk support for political parties if they are not supported by the wider community.

4. CONCLUSION

The growth of a single candidate Pilkada and the increasing support of political parties in 4 (four) simultaneous Pilkada periods actually contain several phenomena that cannot be ignored, because they have the potential to damage the democratic Pilkada order. These phenomena include the increasing support of political parties for single candidate, pragmatic party coalitions, bulk political party, and the high costs of candidates in obtaining nomination tickets. Therefore, to maintain the quality of the Pilkada as mandated by the constitution, corrective steps are urgently needed so that the problem does not spread to the implementation of the next Pilkada. The concrete step is the need to revise the Pilkada law, regarding three things, *first*, the need to lower the threshold for nomination of regional heads by political parties and the requirements for support for single candidate. *Second*, organizing the formation of party coalitions by involving regional KPUs and determining the maximum limits. *Third*, strengthening the legitimacy of a single candidate by rearranging the conditions for a single candidate to be elected by linking it to the level of voter turnout. With such a strategy, negative phenomena that can undermine the Pilkada order will be avoided.

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55 Fadli Ramadhanil, Veri Junaidi, and Ibrohim, *Desain Partisipasi Masyarakat Dalam Pemantauan Pemilu*, ed. Sidik Pramono and Retno Widyastuti (Jakarta: Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia atas kerjasama dengan Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi (Perludem), 2015).

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